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Restitution for the Defaulting Buyer
By Malcolm D. Talbott
WHEN AN area of the law is very frequently the subject of litiga-
tion or of negotiation for settlement, this activity may be a signal for
reform. Such litigation or negotiation often occurs when a buyer, under
a sales contract, pays a part of the purchase price or makes a payment
as security and subsequently fails to complete the performance of his
obligation or fails to comply with the conditions to the seller's obliga-
tions. This failure to perform or comply leaves the seller in possession
of the part of the price or security which the buyer has given. While it
is true that certain dam-
ages may have resulted
THE AUTHOR (A.B., 1942, Ohio Wesleyan, from the acts or omissions
LL.B., 1948, Western Reserve, graduate work of the buyer, the value of
1948-49 New York University) is a professor the security or the price
of Law at Rutgers University at Newark, New
Jersey. held by the seller may ex-
ceed those damages. A
defaulting buyer must
make good those damages which are sustained by a seller, but there may
well be a balance of net benefit held 'by the seller. This brings into
consideration the question of the restitution of the net benefit in order
to prevent unjust enrichment of the seller.'
Restitution is one of the most frequently overlooked solutions to
legal problems and it is often rejected by American courts in favor of
more familiar, traditional solutions which are suggested by lawyers. It
is submitted that a statutory provision often accomplishes only that
which could have been accomplished, in its absence, upon sound theory
of law. The need for statutory enactment is not lessened by that fact,
however.
COMMON LAW DEVELOPmENT
The common law development of possible recovery of benefits by a
defaulting buyer under an entire contract brought legal policies into
conflict. It pitted the policy of enforcing contracts and their provisions
"RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTON § 1 (1937). "A person who has been unjustly en-
riched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other."; DAW-
SON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 1 (1951) also refers to a maxim of Pomponius: "For
this by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer through another's loss."
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
for full performance 2 against the policy of opposing forefeitures.3 An-
other way of viewing the conflict which arose is to consider remedial
restitution as being pitted against substantive contract law.4
Keener 5 and Costigane attempted to distinguish fact situations in
which a defaulting party had failed to perform conditions implied in
law from those in which he had failed to comply with express or im-
plied in fact conditions. Their theory was that, inasmuch as such im-
plied in law conditions are supplied by the law to effect justice between
the parties, they need not be given effect or even supplied where the
circumstances indicate some recovery is due the defaulting party. The
development of the mitigating doctrines of substantial performance,7
severability or divisibility of contracts8 and prevention of unjust enrich-
men O seem to support this point of view. Jurisdictions which grant re-
lief to defaulting parties on these grounds may really be attempting to
use these compartmentalized techniques to give effect to the basic resti-
tutionary concept of distributive justice to prevent unjust enrichment.
'Dulge v. Whiteson, 292 Pa. 334, 141 A. 230 (1928) cites cases ranging'from
Martin v. Schoenberger, 8 Watts & S. 367, 368 (1845), *"To permit a man to re-
cover for part performance of an entire contract, or to permit him to recover on his
agreement where he has failed to perform, would tend to demoralize the whole
country." to Rifling v. Idell, 291 Pa. 472, 474, 140 A. 270, 271 (1928) "If the
vendors were not in default there can be no recovery of the hand money by the pur-
chaser." to illustrate the continuous application of the policy in Pennsylvania
throughout the years.
'3RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 357 (1932); Goble, Quasi Contracts - Right of a
Defaulting Plaintiff, 22 ILL. L. REv. 315 (1927); Michigan Yacht Co. v. Busch,
143 Fed. 929, 934 (1906), "In justice the defendants have no right to more of this
money than will compensate them against loss by reason of the plaintiffs conduct.
His action is therefore one upon the common counts for money received under an
implied [in law] promise to pay back that which is in excess of the loss sustained
by the defendants by reason of the plaintiff's refusal to carry out the contract."
' See Corman, Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default Under Sales
Contract, 34 TEXAs L. REv. 582 (1956).
"KEENER, QUASI-CoNTRACTs 225-231 (1926).
'Costigan, Conditions in Contracts, 7 CoLuM. L. REv. 151, 152. "Conditions im-
plied by law are those read into the contract by the courts to meet the needs of jus-
tice. This is how they differ from express conditions and from conditions implied
in fact, both of which rest on the real or supposed actual intention of the parties.
Conditions implied by law are conditions supplied by the court to govern in situa-
tions which the parties did not expressly provide for, because for one reason or an-
other they never contemplated that the situation would arise."
'Boone v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 273, Note b. (1777). See also RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 375 (1932) for analogous doctrine.
8 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 262 (1932).
'Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012 (1760). "This kind of equitable action
[money had and received) to recover back money, which ought not in justice to be
kept, is very beneficial, and therefore much encouraged. It lies only for money
which, ex alquo et bono, the defendant ought to refund."; see also, RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 357 (1932).
[September
RESTITUTION FOR DEFAULTING BUYER
Attempts to classify the cases in which a defaulting party's right to
recover has been considered have added to the confusion which sur-
rounds the basic problems of policy. The classifications' 0 have dealt
with:
1. The type or kind of benefit involved.
2. The fault of the party failing to perform, i.e., the willfulness of
the default, or lack of it.
3. The subject matter of the transaction.
4. The proportionate relation between the default and the antici-
pated performance.
While these classifications have some merit in clarifying by organiza-
tion, it appears that the classifications do not reach the basic problem of
determining whether there has been an unconscionable enrichment of
one person at the expense of another. While determination of whether
services, chattels, money or land is involved as the subject matter of
the transaction will help in determining the value or returnabiity of the
benefit, it does not determine the enrichment question. If anything, such
classification may be detrimental to a defaulting party because of an un-
willingness on the part of the courts to resolve any doubt in favor a
party who has defaulted" and who has been classified as a willful de-
faulter.
- A classification made on the basis of willful or involuntary breach
has been adopted by a number of courts12 in determining whether there
may be recovery by a plaintiff in default. The right of the party in de-
fault is thus made dependent upon the character of his "breach.." The
Restatement of Contractsa3 indicates that a "breach" may be made know-
20 WooDwARD, QuAsI CoNTRcts, Ch. X (1913); Report of N.Y. Law Rev.
Com. 179-243 (1942); KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTS, Ch. IV (1926).
"Professor Patterson in his study for the N. Y. Law Revision Commission, supra,
note 10, cites the opinion of Comstock, J. in Smith v. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173, 186-187
(1858) as a good example of such a judicial attitude. The court said, "Indeed in
this state the sanctity of contracts . . . has been steadily maintained, and no en-
couragement has ever been given to that loose and dangerous doctrine which allows
a person to violate his most solemn engagements and then to draw the injured party
into a controversy concerning the amount and value of the benefits received."
' Early decisions are very numerous: Hogan v. Titlow & Prince, 14 Cal. 255 (1859);
Eldridge v. Rowe, 7 Ill. 91 (1845); Miller v. Goddard, 34 Me. 102 (1852); Hap-
good v. Shaw, 105 Mass. 276 (1870); Hanley and Hanley v. Walker, 79 Mich. 607
(1890); Peterson v. Mayer, 46 Minn. 468, 49 N.W. 245 (1891); Brown v. Fitch,
33 N.J.L 418 (1867); Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131 (1881); Larkin v. Buck,
11 Ohio St. 561 (1860); Shaw v. The Turnpike, 3 Pen. S.W. 445 (1832); Mal-
bon v. Birney, 11 Wis. 107 (1860). See also, RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 357
(1932).
'"REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 357 (1932).
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ingly and yet not be willful and deliberate. The comment 14 includes
"breach" as the result of mere negligence, error of judgment, mistake of
fact or law, hardship, insolvency or circumstances that tend appreciably
toward moral justification as examples of "non-willful" breaches. There-
fore the word willful has a limited meaning as so used, for breaches
knowingly made are not nwcessarily willful breaches. Classification of a
breach as willful or involuntary may merely indicate the result of the
court's reflecting upon the equitable positions of the parties.15 It is sug-
gested that determination of cases by the use of such a classification raises
the possibility of unfairness if a court overlooks these relative positions
in favor of accepting the equation of a deliberate act with a willful one.
The proportionate relation between the default and the anticipated
performance has affected the decisions with regard to defaulting plaintiffs
under contracts. The concept of severability or divisibility of contract has
been applied, particularly in employment contracts.iO It appears that the
severability doctrine accomplished the same result as the restitutionary
remedy in quasi contract would have accomplished. While any type of
contract may be the subject of a determination as to whether or not its terms
permit completed part performance as the basis of requiring a unit perform-
ance from the other party to the contract, the cases arise primarily in
connection with personal service contracts and agreements to sell goods.
A few courts have taken a more total view and have refused to recognize
the sanctity of the technical unity and entirety of contracts in favor of
the more just theory of prevention of unjust enrichment.1
1 Id. at § 357 (1) par. e.
Restitution for Benefit Conferred by a Party in Default Under a Contract, N. Y.
LEG. Doc. No. 65 (f) 199 (1942).
"This was especially applied where the contract provided for periodic payment in
return for services of a certain amount over a definite period of time. Dayton v.
Dean, 23 Conn. 99 (1854); Winterhalter v. Johnson, 1 Ohio Dec. 575 (1851);
See Corman, The Partial Performance Interest of the Defaulting Employee, 38
MARQ. L. Ray. 139, 153 (1954). But see Larkin v. Buck, 11 Ohio St. 561 (1860)
where no severability was found and employee was denied any recovery in quantum
meruit for those services already performed.
'In Kirkland v. Archbold, 113 N.E. 2d 496, 499 (1953), the Court of Appeals of
Ohio states: "The result of decisions which deny a defaulting contractor all right of
recovery even though his work has enriched the estate of the other party to the con-
tract is to penalize the defaulting contractor to the extent of the value of all benefit
conferred by his work and materials upon the property of the other party. This
result comes from unduly emphasizing the technical unity and entirety of contracts.
Some decisions permit such result only when the defaulting contractor's conduct was
willful or malicious.
An ever-increasing number of decisions of courts of last resort now modify the
severity of this rule and permit defaulting contractors, where their work has con-
tributed substantial value to the other contracting party's property, to recover the
value of the work and materials expended on a quantum meruit basis, the recovery
being diminished, however, to the extent of such damage as the contractor's breach
[September
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STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act1 8 a defaulting seller
of goods was generally permitted to recover the fair value of his partial
performance.'9 A few jurisdictions,20 following an especially consistent
group of New York cases21 did not permit the seller to secure any recovery
for goods delivered in partial fulfillment of a contract for the sale of
goods.
The Uniform Sales Act contained no provision which involved the
defaulting buyer's right to restitution. Whatever progress which was made
on behalf of restitution for a defaulting seller prior to the sales act could
be traced to an early English decision M which set a precedent for subse-
quent cases in England and America as well as for subsequent statutory
enactment.
23
Although a conflict existed24 the early decisions generally denied re-
lief to the defaulting buyer.25 Various reasons have been given for
denying relief to the buyer" by courts which would give relief to a
causes the other party. These decisions are based on the theory of unjust enrich-
ment:."
u UNFORm SALES Acr, § 44.
Gibboney v. Wayne, 141 Ala. 300, 37 So. 436 (1904); Richards v. Shaw, 67 Ill.
222 (1873); Hedden v. Roberts, 134 Mass. 38 (1883); Clark v. Moore, 3 Mich.
55 (1853); Viles v. Barre & M. Tiaction & Power Co., 79 Vt 311, 65 A. 104
(1906); McCurry v. Purgason, 170 N.C. 463, 87 S.E. 244 (1915).
'Holden Steam Mill Co. v. Westervelt, 67 Me. 446 (1877); Haslack v. Mayers,
26 N.J.L 284 (1857); Ashbrooke v. Hite, 9 Ohio St. 358 (1859); Witherow v.
Witherow, 16 Ohio Rep. 238 (1847). The Uniform Sales Act was subsequently
enacted in each of these jurisdictions, however.
'Champlin v. Rowley, 13 Wend. (N.Y.) 258 (1835); Nightingale v. Biseman,
121 N.Y. 288, 24 N.E. 475 (1890). WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 176.
nOxendale v. Wetherell, 9 B. & C. 386, 109 Eng. Rep. 141 (1826).
"English SALE OF GooDs Acr § 30, Ch. 71 of 56 and 57 Victoria, 1894;
UNIFoam SALES ACT § 44 (1), as approved by Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws: '"Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods less than he
contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them, but if the buyer accepts or retains the
goods so delivered, knowing that the seller is not going to perform the contract in
full, he must pay for them at the contract rate. If, however, the buyer has used or
disposed of the goods delivered before he knows that the seller is not going to per-
form his contract in full, the buyer shall not be liable for more than the fair value
to him of the goods so received."
Cherry Valley Iron Works v. Florence Iron Co., 64 Fed. 569, (1894); Hickock v.
Hoyt, 33 Conn. 553 (1866); Gilbreth v. Grewell, 13 Ind. 484 (1859).
' Hansborough v. Peck, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 497 (1866); Colvin v. Weedman, 50 IlM.
311 (1869); Ketchum v. Everetson, 13 Johns. R. 299 (N.Y. 1816); Green v.
Green, 9 Cow. 46 (N.Y. 1828).
' Corman, Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default Under a Sales
Contract, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 582, 591-92 (1956).
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defaulting seller, with or without the benefit of a statute, whether in cases
involving sale of goods or sale of land.2 7
The objection that the burden of proving damages should not be
placed on the seller where the buyer has defaulted can be met by placing
the burden upon the defaulting buyer,28 unless justice requires that the
burden should be upon the seller?9  Stare decisis has caused a repetition
of phrases such as: "No rule is more firmly settled with relation to con-
tracts for purchase, whether concerning real or personal property, than
that to the effect that a vendee who without lawful right refuses to go
on with his contract, cannot recover from a vendor not in default, who
is ready and willing to proceed and fulfill his obligations, all or any of
the money he has paid to the vendor in accord with the terms of the
agreement."3 0
Other objections are based upon the sanctity of an agreement and
seem to take away, in a relative manner, the acknowledged choice of a
buyer to perform or to default and answer in reasonable damages.3 '
Statutory enactment on behalf of the defaulting buyer was possible at
the -time of the Sales Act development. It appears that Williston, who
drafted a great deal of the Uniform Sales Act was in favor of restitution
for a defaulting buyer,32 yet the provisions were not included. Certain
Howe, Forfeitures in Land Contracts, CURRENT TRENDs IN STATE LEGISLATION,
417, 442 (1953-54), where it is indicated that the courts are extremely solicitous
of an innocently defaulting vendor as compared to the treatment given to an inno-
cently defaulting vendee. See also McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 177 (1935) for com-
parative measures of damage for defaulting parties.
' Stennick v. Jones, 252 Fed. 345 (9th Cir. 1918); Major Blakeney Corp. v. Jen-
kins, 121 Cal. App. 2d 325, 263 P.2d 655 (1953); Lytie v. Scottish American
Mortgage Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 S.E. 402 (1905); Harrington v. Eggen, 51 N.D. 87,
199 N.W. 447 (1924); Dluge v. Whiteson, 292 Pa. 334, 141 A. 230 (1928);
Quinlan v. St. John, 28 Wyo. 91, 201 P. 1088 (1922) but see, Lawrence v. Demos,
70 Wyo. 56, 244 P.2d 793 (1952).
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Currie in Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526,
59 N.W.2d 489 (1953) indicates that purchaser's proof of resale to another by
vendor for $1,500.00 in excess of contract price within two months of purchaser's
default would prima facie establish that the vendor had suffered no loss by reason
of the purchaser's breach. In his opinion, the burden should then fall upon the
vendor to prove special damages in order for him to claim the down payment of
the plaintiff, purchaser.
'
0Tomboy Gold & Copper Co. v. Marks, 185 Cal. 336, 337, 197 P. 94, 95 (1921).
Thach v. Durham, 120 Colo. 253, 257, 208 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1949) summar-
izes well all the objections which have appeared in the cases in a concise manner. It
is interesting to note that this opinion leaves the following safety valve even though
denying relief: "In situations where the rule effects injustice; - where equitable
grounds of fraud or surprise or unavoidable accident or ignorance, not wilful, ap-
peal to the conscience of the Court, equity will intervene."
'WILLISTON, CoN'rRAcTs § 1476 (rev. ed. 1937). See also, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No.
65 (f) 53 (1942).
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subsequent statutory efforts have been made on behalf of a defaulting
buyer.33 These provisions, for the most part, cover specific problems
and were included in the drafts of revisions of the Sales Act. However
these revisions have met with little success.
Several states have made legislative efforts on behalf of the defaulting
buyer,34 while California 5 and Federal courts36 have spoken judicially
upon the problem in favor of the defaulting buyer. The New York3 7
The buyer in default was considered under the RMSED UNIFORm SALEs ACT
(Second Draft 1941) § 64 (2) (a) where "Any down or part payment or deposit
made upon a contract to sell or a sale, is deemed to be made for security and shall
in the event of breach by the buyer be limited to serving as security. [This applies]
whether or not such payment or deposit is agreed to be applied upon the price and
irrespective of any provision for its forfeiture, and whether it is in the form of
money, check, goods or otherwise." The Proposed Final Draft of the UNiFoRm
REvisED SALES AcT § 124 (2) provides: "A deposit or down payment of more
than 20% of the price or $500, whichever is smaller, made as security and to be
forfeited on breach, is so forfeited only to the extent that it is a reasonable liquida-
tion of damages." This Final Draft restricts the action of 5 124 (2) [the same
section as § 64 (2) (a) under the Second Draft] to cases where the performance
by the buyer was intended as security and thus narrows the operation of the final
section 124 (2) to such instances.
"N.Y. PEns. PROP. LAw § 145 (a) (1952), see also LEG. Doc. No. 65 (f), Re-
port of the Law Rev. Com. 179-243 (1942) and LEG. Doc. No. 65 (c), Report of
the Law Rev. Com. 83-101 (1952); MD. LAWS 1941, Ch. 851, § 116 or 83 M..
CODE ANNOT. § 134 (1957).
'Crofoot v. Weger, 109 Cal. App. 839, 241 P.2d 1017 (1952).
'Armtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press and Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103
(2d Cir. 1953).
'Sec. 145 (a) of N.Y. PEns. PROP. LAW provides: '"When buyer in default en-
titled to restitution
1. Where the buyer has defaulted by failing to pay money or transfer goods as
required of him by the contract of sale but has made payments or transfers of goods
in part performance of the contract, and the seller fails or refuses to deliver the goods
which he had contracted to deliver and is justified therein by the buyer's default, the
buyer is entitled to restitution of that amount, if any, by which the payments he
has made, or the reasonable value of the goods at the time of the transfer, or, as the
case may be, if the sum thereof, exceeds
(a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by the terms of a clause, if any,
in the contract, which constitutes a reasonable liquidation in advance of the seller's
anticipated damages; or,
(b) in the absence of such a clause, twenty per cent of the value of the total
performance for which the buyer is obligated under the contract.
2. The buyer's right to restitution as defined in subdivision one is subject to
offset,
(a) in the absence of a liquidated damage clause described in subdivision one,
by the amount of damages suffered by the seller, for which recovery is permitted
by section one hundred forty-five of this chapter, and
(b) in any case, by the amount or value of the benefits, if any, received by
the buyer directly or indirectly by reason of the contract. In any action or counter-
claim by the buyer seeking restitution as provided in this section, the seller seeking
to deny or reduce the amount of his liability to make restitution shall have the bur-
den of proof as to this offset." See, Pearson International, Inc. v. Congeladora De-
Mazatlan, S.A., 141 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1955).
19581
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
and Maryland38 statutes deal with parts of the problem but not as broadly
as is needed to resolve the problems arising due to the many kinds of
relationships of sellers and defaulting buyers. The limitations of the
leading federal judicial solutions have been noted frequently,39 while the
development in California has dealt largely with the vendor and vendee
in land sale cases. 40
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In May of 1951, the American Law Institute. and the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws approved the Uniform Com-
mercial Code4' which was subsequently revised in the form of its 1957
official text. This Code recognizes the interest of a buyer in a number
of sections and gives a greater recognition to buyers' interests42 than
previously adopted statutes have given. The relationship created by the
Uniform Commercial Code is one of mutual assurance for buyers and
sellers.
The Uniform Commercial Code has now been adopted in three states43
and it appears that it will shortly be adopted in others. The Code will,
Is83 MD. CODE ANNOT. § 134 (1957) provides: "(a) In general. - Whenever,
under any installment sale agreement, the buyer is required to make one or more
payments to the seller in addition to any down payment made at the time of the
execution of the agreement, before the seller is obligated to deliver the goods sold,
then the buyer may, at any time before delivery or tender of the goods by the seller,
cancel the agreement. Thereupon, notwithstanding any provision of the agreement,
the seller shall be obligated to refund to the buyer, within ten (10) days after notice
of such cancellation, an amount equal to at least ninety per cent (90%) of all pay-
ments made by the buyer under the agreement, including any down payment.
(b) Down payments. - Where, however, under an installment sale agree-
ment, a down payment is made at the time of its execution and the buyer thereby
becomes entitled to delivery of the goods before making further payments, then, if
the buyer refuses to accept delivery of the goods in accordance with the agreement,
all or part of the down payment may be forfeited to the extent provided in the
agreement."
" 39 CORNELL L.Q. 736 (1954); 67 HARV. L REV. 347 (1953); 8 MIAMI L.Q.
648 (1954); 52 MICH. L. REv. 928 (1953); 38 MINN. L REv. 172 (1953); 11
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 269 (1954).
4025 SO. CALIF. L. REv. 387 (1952); Freedman v. Rector, 37 Cal.2d 16, 230 P.2d
629 (1951).
' The Congress and the state legislatures were urged to adopt the UNIFORM COM-
MERCiAL CODE at the time of its approval.
12UNiFOR COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-601, 2-602 - 2-604, (1957). UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-606 (1) (b) and (c) (1957). The buyer cannot escape
the obligation of assuring performance under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-609, however. See Broeker, Lecture on Articles 2 and 6: Sals and Bulk Trans-
fers, 15 U. PITT. L. REv. 541, 559 (1954).
412A PENNA. STAT. ANNOr. (1953); ANNOT. LAWS OF MASS. Ch. 106 (1957);
KY. SENATE BILL No. 169 (1958 Ch. 77, eff. July 1, 1960).
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therefore, in all probability, be the law of the future in controlling com-
mercial transactions.
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code the amelio-
rating doctrine against enforcement of penalties and forfeitures was
urged as the answer to the protection of the buyer's interest.4 4 The ab-
sence of an' express provision for forfeiture or liquidated damages was
given as a reason for granting restitution to a defaulting party. 5 Some
courts refused to enforce the forfeiture in favor of the seller, upon de-
fault by the buyer, even if there was an express forfeiture clause present.48
However, most jurisdictions give great weight to the express terms of
an agreement which provide that in case default by a purchaser occurs,
the seller may retain as liquidated damages, payments which have been
made by the purchaser or that installments paid by a -buyer shall be for-
feited.4 7 It was to reach these cases that Section 2-71848 of the Uniform
"See, Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Veidee to the Restitution of Installments
Paid, 40 YALE LJ. 1013 (1931). The following cases have cited this article which
has crystallized the thinking in this area:
Freedman v. Rector, 37 Cal.2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951); Armtorg Trading
Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953); Schwartz v. Syver,
264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W.2d 489 (1953).
'Michigan Yacht Co. v. Busch, 143 Fed. 929 (6th Cir. 1906); Lloyd v. Davis, 2
Ind. App. 170, 28 N.E. 232 (1891); Dooley v. Stillson, 46 RI. 332, 128 A. 217
(1925).
"Sherburne v. Hirst, 121 Fed. 998 (1903); Langlois v. Maloney, 95 N.H. 408,
64 A.2d 697 (1949); Weissenberger v. Central Acceptance Corp., 64 Ohio App.
398, 28 N.E.2d 794 (1940); Dependabilt Homes v. White, 117 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio
1951); Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952).
'"Hansbrough v. Peck, 72 U.S. 497 (1866) and numerous cases in many jurisdic-
tions, 31 A.L.R.2d 1.
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Com. 1 and 2 provide: 1. Under subsection (1)
liquidated damage clauses are allowed where the amount involved is reasonable in
the light of the circumstances of the case. The subsection sets forth explicitly the
elements to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a liquidated damage
clause. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is expressly made void
as a penalty. An unreasonably small amount would be subject to similar criticism
and might be stricken under the section on unconscionable contracts or clauses.
2. Subsection (2) refuses to recognize a forfeiture unless the amount of the
payment so forfeited represents a reasonable liquidation of damages as determined
under subsection (1). A special exception is made in the case of small amounts
(20% of the price or $500, whichever is smaller) deposited as security. No dis-
tinction is made between cases in which the payment is to be applied on the price
and those in which it is intended as security for performance. Subsection (2) is
applicable to any deposit or down or part payment. In the case of a deposit or turn
in of goods resold before the breach, the amount actually received on the resale is
to be viewed as the deposit rather than the amount allowed the buyer for the trade
in. However, if the seller knows of the breach prior to the resale of the goods turned
in, he must make reasonable efforts to realize their true value, and this is assured
by requiring him to comply with the conditions laid down in the section on resale
by an aggrieved seller."
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Commercial Code appears to have been enacted. This section apparently
does not deal with those cases where no liquidated damage provision
appears in the agreement. 49 However, any express provision for retain-
ing money may be construed to be a liquidated damage clause, penalty
clause or forfeiture clause but, at the same time, the mere fact that a
provision is termed penalty, forfeiture or liquidated damages does not
necessarily make it any of these.50 Several additional significant matters
arising out of the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-71851 have been
noted:
1. It connects the problem of the buyer's restitution with the prob-
lem of liquidated damages....
3. It adopts the twenty-per-cent allowance provided for in the statute
recommended by the New York Law Revision Commission in 19 4 2 '
but modified it with a fixed sum: $500.
4. It applies the same rule to both 'part payments' and 'deposits.'
5. It is silent as to what would happen if, after the buyer had paid
95 per cent of the price, the seller chose to tender the goods without fur-
ther payment rather than repay the money.5
Prior to time of the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in
*"Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Com. 83, 100 (1952): "It [U.C.C. § 2-718J apparently
covers only the situations where the contract provides expressly for forfeiture of the
buyer's payment. Most of the reported cases show no provision either way."
'
0 Corbin, CONTRACTS § 1133 (1951).
51 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718, "(1) Damages for breach by either party
may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in
the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of
proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an
adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as
a penalty.
(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods because of the
buyer's breach, the buyer is entitled to restitution of any amount by which the sum
of his payments exceeds
(a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by virtue of terms liquidating the
seller's damages in accordance with subsection (1), or
(b) in the absence of such terms, twenty per cent of the value of the total per-
formance for which the buyer is obligated under the contract or $500,
whichever is smaller.
(3) The buyer's right to restitution under subsection (2) is subject to offset
to the extent that the seller establishes
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of this Article other than
subsection (1), and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the buyer directly or in-
directly by reason of the contract.
(4) Where a seller has received payment in goods their reasonable value or the
proceeds of their resale shall be treated as payments for the purposes of subsection
(2); but if the seller has notice of the buyer's breach before reselling goods re-
ceived in part performance, his resale is subject to the conditions laid down in this
Article on resale by an aggrieved seller."
5 2Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Com. 179 (1942).
r'Supra note 50.
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Pennsylvania, no statute existed in that state to deal with the buyer's
claim for restitution in relation to liquidation or limitation of damages
or deposit situations. Cases had dealt frequently with distinctions be-
tween enforceable liquidated damage clauses and unenforceable penalty
clauses.54 Generally speaking, Pennsylvania followed the Restatement
of Contracts.5 5 The Uniform Commercial Code will relate that doctrine
to the specific context of sales involving a defaulting buyer.
In Massachusetts, where the Uniform Commercial Code will soon be
in operation, there is presently no statute dealing with the problems of
the defaulting buyer and liquidated damages. Massachusetts is in line
with the Restatement of Contracts5 6 with regard to the effect of pro-
visions authorizing liquidated damages and again that doctrine will be
specifically related to the defaulting buyer cases in sales agreements. 57
The "return of the down payment" provisions in Section 2-718(2) of the
Uniform Commercial Code will apparently increase the range of remedies
available to a defaulting buyer in Massachusetts,58 although the precedent
for permitting retention of deposits by the seller arose largely in land con-
tract cases.
59
Kentucky, which is the only other state to adopt the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to date, has used the "reasonable forecast of just compensa-
tion and incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation '6 0 test. It
further appears that early cases are in accord with the present provisions
of Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-718(2) . 1
These jurisdictions supply examples of what will occur in others if
these Code provisions are adopted. The statutory disposition of the
problem will aid in establishing the possible recovery by a defaulting
r'Distinction discussed: Gross v. Exeter Mach. Works, 277 Pa. 363, 121 A. 195
(1923); Liquidated damage provision sustained: Holmes Electric Protective Co. v.
Goldstein, 147 Pa. Super. 506, 24 A.2d 161 (1942); Martindale, Inc. v. Gorman,
165 Pa. Super. 612 (1950); Contractual provision void as penalty: Germain Lum-
ber Co. v. U.S., 56 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1944).
0 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 339, 340, 357 (1932); see also Pennsylvania An-
notations to Restatement, CONTRACTS (1933).
rREsTATBMENT, CONTRAcrs § 339 (1932).
T Calvin Hosmer, Stolte Co. v. Paramount Cone Co., 285 Mass. 278, 189 N.E. 192
(1934).
' See, Massachasetts Annotations to RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS §§ 340, 357 (2)
(1935).
tmChertok v. Kassabian, 255 Mass. 265, 151 N.E. 108 (1926); Beck v. Doore, 319
Mass. 707, 67 N.E.2d 479 (1946).
"IRESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 339 (1) (a) (b) (1932); Potter v. Dark To-
bacco Growers Co-operative Ass'n., 201 Ky. 441, 257 S.W. 33 (1923); Fidelity and
Deposit Co. of Md. v. Jones, 256 Ky. 181, 75 S.W.2d 1057 (1934).
"Elizabethtown & Paducah R. Co. v. Geoghegan, 72 Ky. (9 Bush.) 56 (1872);
Tandy's Assignee v. Hatcher & Co., 9 Ky. Law Rep. 150 (1887).
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buyer in restitution where the net benefit exceeds the reasonable amount
necessary to compensate the seller.
CONCLUSION
Where the statutes have established a right for restitution by the
buyer who has defaulted, it seems clear no difficulty will arise. These
provisions, however, are too few or too limited. The entire area of agree-
ments without provisions for liquidated damages has not been expressly
dealt with by legislatures. Unless construction of statutes or interpreta-
tion of agreements permit the inclusion of some of these cases within
the provisions of the statutory solutions, we will still have a great many
instances bringing on problems in litigation and settlement with regard
to the distributive justice necessary between a defaulting buyer and his
seller where a net benefit accrues to the seller.
Damages for breach of contract are to be compensatory in nature
rather than punitive, and to prevent relief for a defaulting buyer of a
net benefit in the hands of the seller definitely creates punitive damages.
Section 2-718 of the Uniform Commercial Code has established a
principle which can be interpreted to deal with cases where no liquidated
damage clause, forfeiture or penalty is included in an agreement. Since
the effect of the Code section is to destroy the effectiveness of such pro-
visions authorizing the retention of money, security, or other net benefits,
we find that the section is really operating, after the destruction of such
provisions, in a context where no such provision exists. This is just what
occurs when no such provision appeared in the agreement originally. It
must be acknowledged that where provisions for retention of money are
classified as forfeitures we have a "wrong doing" characterstic in the seller.
It may, perhaps be suggested that we would only take net benefits
from the seller where he is found at "fault" by imposing such a fore-
feiting provision upon the buyer. This does not appear sensible, how-
ever, for if the buyer is considered at "fault" because of his breach, we
would find both parties at "fault." The basic idea of compensating the
seller for whatever losses he suffers through the buyer's exercise of his
power to stop performance, but preventing punitive measures against
the buyer by permitting him to recover the net benefit proved by him
will prevent unjust enrichment of the seller at the expense of the de-
faulting buyer.
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